ЗА ПРЕДЕЛИТЕ НА НЕЗАВИСИМОСТТА НА НАЦИОНАЛНИЯ РЕГУЛАТОРЕН ОРГАН В ОБЛАСТТА НА ЕНЕРГЕТИКАТА
Резюме
Резюме: Анализирани са рискове пред независимостта на регулаторните органи като основополагащ елемент при либерализацията на енергийните пазари в Европейския съюз в светлината на теорията за „улавянето“ (the capture theory). Изследвани са въпроси, свързани с нормативните аспекти и с актуалната съдебна практика, определящи параметрите и гаранциите за независимост на регулаторните органи. Те са разгледани в контекста на сегашната криза с цените на електрическата енергия и националните мерки, предприети за справяне с тези предизвикателства, по отношение на регулирания сегмент. Отправени са препоръки за привеждането в съответствие с добрите практики и с актуалните изисквания, свързани с независимостта на националния регулаторен орган в областта на енергетиката.
Ключови думи
JEL класификация
Как да се цитира
Литература (библиография)
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